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Abstract. The imperfections of a receiver’s detector affect the performance of two-
way continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocols and are difficult to adjust
in practical situations. We propose a method to improve the performance of two-
way continuous-variable quantum key distribution by adding a parameter-adjustable
optical amplifier at the receiver. A security analysis is derived against a two-mode
collective entangling cloner attack. Our simulations show that the proposed method
can improve the performance of protocols as long as the inherent noise of the amplifier
is lower than a critical value, defined as the tolerable amplifier noise. Furthermore, the
optimal performance can approach the scenario where a perfect detector is used.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is one of the most practical applications in the
field of quantum information. Its goal is to establish a secure key between two legitimate
partners, usually called Alice and Bob. Continuous-variable quantum key distribution
(CV-QKD) [3] has attracted much attention in the past few years [2, 3, 4] mainly because
it only uses standard telecom components. A CV-QKD protocol based on coherent
states [5, 6] with Gaussian modulation has been experimentally demonstrated [7, 8, 9, 4]
and has been shown to be secure against arbitrary collective attacks [10, 11]. Such an
attack is the most optimal in the asymptotical limit [12] and is also used in the finite-size
regime [13, 14].
To enhance the tolerable excess noise of CV-QKD, compared to the typical one-way
schemes, the two-way CV-QKD was proposed [15]. Recently, a more feasible two-way
CV-QKD protocol was proposed by replacing Alice’s displacement operation with a
beam splitter and inserting thermal noise into it. This leads to a protocol that is easier
to analyze when considering channel estimation [16].
In practice, the detector’s imperfections, mainly characterized by the detection
efficiency and electronic noise, will affect the performance of two-way CV-QKD protocols
and are hard to adjust in an experiment [4, 9]. In this paper, we insert an optical
amplifier before Bob’s detection by which the receiver’s efficiency and noise can be
optimized to improve the performance of two-way CV-QKD protocols using reverse
reconciliation. Previously, similar method had only been analyzed for the case of one-
way [17] and one-way four-state [18] reverse reconciliation schemes. Using numerical
simulations, we propose a specific two-mode collective entangling cloner attack as Eve’s
action.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we review the two-way CV-QKD
protocols with imperfect detectors and describe the extended model of the detector. In
Sec. 3, we first analyze the different optical amplifier models and their suitable scopes
of application. Then we derive security bounds of the protocols with different optical
amplifiers. Finally, the simulation results under collective entangling cloner attack are
provided to compare the performances of the protocols with and without the amplifiers.
Our conclusions are drawn in Sec. 4.
2. Security analysis of two-way CV-QKD protocols with imperfect detector
In the following, we first review the basic notions of the entanglement-based model
related to the Gaussian-modulated two-way CV-QKD protocols with imperfect detec-
tion [16, 19]. The entanglement-based model with imperfect detectors is illustrated
in Fig. 1 and can be described as follows:
Step 1: Bob initially prepares an EPR pair (EPR1 with variance VB, where the shot
noise variance is normalized to 1), keeps one mode B1 and sends the other mode B2 to
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Figure 1. Entanglement-based scheme of Gaussian-modulated two-way CV-QKD
protocols with imperfect homodyne or heterodyne detection where the quantum
channel is fully controlled by Eve. However, Eve has no access to the apparatuses
in Alice’s and Bob’s stations.
Alice through the channel where Eve may perform her attack.
Step 2: Alice prepares another EPR pair (EPR2 with variance VA). She keeps mode A1
and measures it using heterodyne detection to get the variables xAx ,pAp . The modes A0
and B0 represent vacuum state. She then couples mode A2 and the received mode Ain
from Bob with a beam splitter (transmittance: TA ∈ [0, 1]). Alice then sends mode Aout
back to Bob, and measures another mode A3 with homodyne detection for parameter
estimation [16].
Step 3: Bob measures his original mode B1 using heterodyne detection to get the vari-
ables xB1x and pB1p . He also measures the received mode B5 with homodyne detection
to get xB5 or with heterodyne detection to get xB5x and pB5p . The detector’s inefficiency
is modelled by a beam splitter with transmittance η, while its electronic noise υel is
modelled by a thermal state ρF0 with variance υ [4].
Step 4: When Bob uses homodyne detection, he uses xBx = xB5 − kxB1x (pBp =
pB5 − kpB1p) to construct the estimator to Alice’s corresponding variable xAx (pAp),
where k is the parameter used to optimize Bob’s estimator of Alices corresponding
value. When Bob uses heterodyne detection, he uses a similar way to construct the
estimators (xBx = xB5x − kxB1x , pBp = pB5p − kpB1p) to (xAx , pAp) at the same time.
Then Alice and Bob proceed with classical data postprocessing namely reconciliation
and privacy amplification. In this paper we use reverse reconciliation [7].
In order for Alice and Bob to perform their measurement, Bob initially sends a
local oscillator with the signal beam to Alice, then Alice couples it with the local
oscillator from her and sends back to Bob with the signal beam. The variance υ of
the thermal state ρF0 is chosen to obtain the appropriate expression for each detection,
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Figure 2. The receiver model which consists of a pre-process phase and the
imperfections of detector with the ancillas ρNi and ρF0G, respectively.
in the following way: for homodyne detection, υ = 1 + υel/(1− η), and for heterodyne
detection, υ = 1+2υel/(1− η) [9]. Adjusting the efficiency η and the variance υ, we can
optimize the performance of the protocols. For instance, the performance of two-way
CV-QKD can be improved by adding noise in homodyne detection [19]. Unfortunately,
for a practical detector, the detection efficiency η and electronic noise υ are fixed between
B3 and B5 (see Fig. 1), and generally speaking they are not the optimal choice. To
improve the performance of the protocols, we can insert an adjustable operation with
ancilla ρNi before detection, noted as the pre-process (see Fig. 2). Therefore the pre-
process phase and the imperfections of the detector constitute a new receiver, whose
efficiency and noise can be optimized to improve the performances of the two-way
schemes.
3. Improvement of two-way CV-QKD protocols with optical amplifiers
In this section, we present two kinds of optical amplifier models [20, 17, 18]: a perfect
phase-sensitive amplifier (PSA) and a practical phase-insensitive amplifier (PIA), as the
pre-process to improve the performances of homodyne and heterodyne detection two-
way CV-QKD protocols, respectively. Simulation results against a two-mode collective
entangling cloner attack are provided to compare the performances of the protocols with
and without the amplifiers.
3.1. Homodyne detection with PSA
A PSA is a degenerate optical parametric amplifier, which permits noiseless
amplification of a chosen quadrature (xˆ or pˆ) [20]. Its mathematical model can be
described by the transformation matrix Y PSA[
xˆ
pˆ
]
out
=
[ √
g 0
0 1
/√
g
]
·
[
xˆ
pˆ
]
in
= Y PSA ·
[
xˆ
pˆ
]
in
, (1)
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Figure 3. (a) The scheme for homodyne detection two-way CV-QKD protocol
when adding a phase sensitive amplifier at the receiver, where the CNOT gate Γx
[21, 22, 23] refers to the postprocessing stage in reverse reconciliation. (b) The scheme
for heterodyne detection two-way CV-QKD protocol when adding a phase insensitive
amplifier at the receiver.
where g > 1 is the gain of the optical amplifier, g = 1 means the optical amplifier does
nothing.
We now derive security bound of the two-way CV-QKD protocol with homodyne
detection adding a PSA before detection at the receiver (see Fig. 3 (a)). When Alice
and Bob use reverse reconciliation, the secret key rate is given by
K = βI(a : b)− S(b : E), (2)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is the reconciliation efficiency, I(a : b) is the classical mutual information
between Alice and Bob, and S(b : E) is the quantum mutual information between Bob
and Eve. The classical mutual information between Alice and Bob can be written as
I(a : b) =
1
2
log VAx −
1
2
log VAx|Bx , (3)
where VAx =
1
2
(VA + 1), VAx|Bx is the variance of mode Ax conditioned on Bob’s data,
and Bob using xBx = xB5 − kxB1x as his final data. The state Bob gets after total
channels is
Bˆ5 =
√
ηgTAT1T2Bˆ2 +
√
1− TAT2ηgAˆ2 +
√
1− ηFˆ0 + Eˆ, (4)
where Eˆ represents the total excess noise introduced by Eve. Bob uses xB5 and xB1x
to construct his estimator of Alice’s variable xA1 , xBx = xB5 − kxB1x , where xB5 , xB1x
and xA1 are the measurement results of the modes Bˆ5, Bˆ1x and Aˆ1. To make Bob’s
estimator as precise as possible, he chooses a value of k to reduce the interference from
Bˆ2, specifically minimizing the variance of xBx
k =
√
2ηgTAT1T2
(VB − 1
VB + 1
)
. (5)
The maximum information available to Eve on Bob’s raw key is bounded by the
Holevo bound [23]
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S(b : E) ≤ χBE = S(ρE)−
∫
p(xBx)S(ρ
xBx
E )dxBx , (6)
where p (xBx) is the probability density function of the measurement output, ρ
xBx
E is the
eavesdropper’s state conditioned on Bob’s measurement result xBx , and S(ρ) is the von
Neumann entropy of the quantum state ρ.
To calculate χBE we first have S (ρA1A3B1B3) = S (ρE) since Eve can purify Alice
and Bob’s system A1A3B1B3 [24]. Second, after Bob’s projective measurement resulting
in xBx , the system A1A3B1pB6EFG is pure, so that S(ρ
xBx
A0A3B1pB6FG
) = S(ρ
xBx
E ), where
S(ρ
xBx
A1A3B1pB6FG
) is independent of xBx for protocols applying Gaussian modulation of
Gaussian states. Thus, χBE becomes
χBE = S(ρA1A3B1B3)− S(ρxBxA1A3B1pB6FG). (7)
The entropies S(ρA1A3B1B3) and S(ρ
xBx
A1A3B1pB6FG
) can be calculated using the
covariance matrices γA1A3B1B3 characterizing the state ρA1A3B1B3 and γ
xBx
A1A3B1pB6FG
characterizing the state ρ
xBx
A1A3B1pB6FG
. So the expression for χBE can be further simplified
as follows
χBE =
4∑
i=1
G
(λi − 1
2
)
−
10∑
i=5
G
(λi − 1
2
)
, (8)
where G(x) = (x + 1) log2(x + 1) − x log2 x, λ1−4 are the symplectic eigenvalues of the
covariance matrix γA1A3B1B3 and λ5−10 are the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance
matrix γ
xBx
A1A3B1pB6FG
. After Alice and Bob measure the mode A1 with heterodyne
detection and measure the modes A3, B1p, Bx and B6 with homodyne detection in
Fig. 1 and Fig. 3 (a), we can get the covariance matrices γA1A3B1B3 and γ
xBx
A1A3B1pB6FG
in experiment. However, in numerical simulation, we could not have the measurement
results and we need the specific description of Eve’s attack [16, 19] to help us to obtain
the final data to calculate the covariance matrices γA1A3B1B3 and γ
xBx
A1A3B1pB6FG
, which
we will describe in the later simulation and discussion part in detail.
3.2. Heterodyne detection with PIA
A PIA is a nondegenerate optical parametric amplifier, which amplifies both
quadratures [20]. However, the amplification process is associated with a fundamental
excess noise. As illustrated in Fig. 3 (b), its mathematical model can be described by a
noiseless amplifier whose transformation matrix is Y PIA and an EPR state of variance
N , one-half of which is entering the amplifier’s second input port[
Bˆ4
Iˆ
]
=
[ √
g · I2
√
g − 1 · σz√
g − 1 · σz √g · I2
]
·
[
Bˆ3
Iˆ0
]
= Y PIA ·
[
Bˆ3
Iˆ0
]
. (9)
The EPR state of variance N is used to represent the inherent noise of the amplifier,
and its covariance matrix is given by
γI0J =
[
N · I2
√
N2 − 1 · σz√
N2 − 1 · σz N · I2
]
. (10)
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Figure 4. The entanglement-based scheme of two-way CV-QKD protocols against a
specific two-mode attack where Eve prepares an EPR pair (EPR3 with variance VE),
she keeps mode E1 and splits mode E2 with a beam splitter whose transmittance is
TE . E3 and E5 are the modes introduced into the channels. T1 and T2 are the channel
transmission efficiencies. Here we use T = T1 = T2 = 10
−ad/10 for calculations and
simulations, where a = 0.2 dB/km is the loss coefficient of the optical fibers, and d is
the length of the quantum channel.
We can now derive security bound of the two-way CV-QKD protocol with
heterodyne detection when adding a PIA at the receiver’s device. For the heterodyne
detection, Bob uses xBx = xB5x − kxB1x and pBp = pB5p − kpB1p to construct
the optimal estimator to Alice’s corresponding variables xAx and pAp , where k =√
ηgTAT1T2(VB − 1)/(VB + 1) for heterodyne detection to reduce the interference from
Bˆ2, specifically minimizing the variance of xBx . We can use the same method to calculate
the classical mutual information between Alice and Bob. The information Eve has is
again given by Eq. (8) and the first part of it remains unchanged. But for the second
part of it, we need to add modes I0 and J to represent the inherent noise of the amplifier
in this case. Then χBE is calculated from the following equations
χBE = S(ρA1A3B3B1)− S
(
ρ
xBx ,pBp
A1A3IJFGB6B7
)
=
4∑
i=1
G
(λi − 1
2
)
−
12∑
i=5
G
(λi − 1
2
)
. (11)
Therefore it is necessary to derive the covariance matrix γ
xBx ,pBp
A1A3IJFGB6B7
, which we
can get after measuring the mode A1 with heterodyne detection and measuring the
modes A3, B6, B7, Bx and Bp with homodyne detection as Fig. 1 and Fig. 3 (b) show.
3.3. Simulation and discussion
As discussed above, we need the specific description of Eve’s attack to help us to
obtain the final data to calculate the covariance matrices γA1A3B1B3 , γ
xBx
A1A3B1pB6FG
and
γ
xBx ,pBp
A1A3IJFGB6B7
for doing the numerical simulation. In the two-way protocol, the two-
mode attack is more general and is used as Eve’s attack (see Fig. 4). Although the
two-mode entangling cloner attack has not been proven to be the optimal attack against
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Figure 5. A comparison among the secret key rates under the following situations:
no amplifier (g = 1), using a phase sensitive amplifier whose gain is 2 or 15 with an
imperfect homodyne detector (η = 0.552, υel = 0.015), and no amplifier with a perfect
homodyne detector (η = 1) under different levels of channel noise: (a)ε = 0.005,
(b)ε = 0.02, (c)ε = 0.2. The reconciliation efficiency β is 0.948 [4].
the two-way protocol, such an attack is the most practical benchmark to test two-way
CV-QKD systems thus far in the literature [16, 19] and we again employ it here. Eve
first prepares an EPR pair (EPR3 with variance VE), she keeps mode E1 and splits mode
E2 into E3 and E4 with a beam splitter whose transmittance is TE. Eve then couples
mode E3 with the original mode B2 from Bob and couples mode E4 with the mode Aout
back to Bob. Therefore Eve can adjust parameter TE to reduce the interference to the
mode B3. When she chooses TE = 1/(1 + TTA) (for more details see Appendix), the
mode B3 can be written as
Bˆ3 =
√
TATBˆ2 +
√
(1− TA)TAˆ2 +
√
(1− T ) (1 + TTA)Eˆ0, (12)
where E0 represents the vacuum state. Thus, we can get the covariance matrices
γA1A3B1B3 , γ
xBx
A1A3B1pB6FG
and γ
xBx ,pBp
A1A3IJFGB6B7
for the numerical simulation (see the
Appendix for a detailed calculation).
The parameters affecting the value of the secret key rate are the reconciliation
efficiency β, the variance of Alice’s and Bob’s modulation: (VA − 1) and (VB − 1), the
transmittance of the beamsplitter at Alice’s side TA, the transmission efficiency T , the
efficiency η and the electronic noise υel of the detector. The parameters VA, VB, β, η
and υel are fixed in all simulations. The variance VA = VB = 40 which allows for the
reconciliation efficiency of β = 0.948, ε = 0.02, η = 0.552 , and υel = 0.015, which
are standard in one-way CV-QKD experiments [4]. We choose TA = 0.4 as the value
of the beamsplitter transmittance at Alice’s side and different levels of channel noise
ε = 0.005, 0.02, 0.2.
Firstly, we consider the performance of an imperfect homodyne detector with a
PSA placed at the output of the quantum channel. We calculate the secret key rate
K as a function of distance d under three situations: without using a PSA, using a
PSA with gain 2 and using a PSA with gain 15. The simulation results are shown in
Fig. 5, where we find that the larger the amplification gain of the PSA, the higher the
secret key rate and the longer the secure transmission distance we can achieve. We also
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Figure 6. A comparison among the secret key rates under the following situations:
no amplifier (g = 1), using a phase insensitive amplifier whose gain is 2 or 15 with
an inherent noise of 1 or 1.5 with an imperfect heterodyne detector (η = 0.552, υel =
0.015), and no amplifier with a perfect heterodyne detector (η = 1) under different
levels of channel noise: (a)ε = 0.005, (b)ε = 0.02, (c)ε = 0.2. The reconciliation
efficiency β is 0.948 [4].
calculate the secret key rate under perfect homodyne detection for comparison. Then
we find that the new transformation of inserting a PSA at the receiver can enhance the
performance of the protocol with imperfect homodyne detection under different levels
of channel noise. The optimal improvement of the proposed method can approach the
performances of the protocol with a perfect homodyne detector.
Secondly, we consider the performance of an imperfect heterodyne detector with a
PIA placed at the output of the quantum channel. We also calculate the secret key rate
under the same three situations. Additionally, we take the inherent noise of the PIA into
account. The inherent noise N of the PIA is set to either 1 for minimal noise (vacuum
noise) or to a more realistic value 1.5 (referred to the input) [17]. These results are
shown in Fig. 6. We observe that the performance of the two-way CV-QKD protocol
with imperfect heterodyne detection is improved by inserting a PIA at the output of
the quantum channel under different levels of channel noise. The protocol under large
amplification and vacuum noise gives the highest key rate, which can approach the secret
key rate of a perfect heterodyne detector. It is shown that the larger the amplification
gain and the smaller the noise of PIA, the higher secret key rate and the longer secure
transmission distance we can achieve. Certainly, for a practical PIA, the noise will not
be as low as the vacuum noise. Therefore, in the practical system, it is important to
know the tolerable PIA noise which means the most inherent noise of the PIA that the
protocol can tolerate. Furthermore, the tolerable PIA noise is also the point that the
method does not work.
As illustrated in Fig. 7 (a), we calculate the secret key rate as a function of the
inherent noise of the PIA with constant gain (g = 15) for a certain fixed distance
(d = 60 km) and channel noise (ε = 0.02) of the protocol. We observe that the
secret key rate decreases as the noise of PIA increases, and a reference line is drawn
to represent the key rate of imperfect heterodyne detection without PIA. Above the
reference line, the performance of the protocol is improved by using a PIA. Therefore
when the transmission distance is 60 km, the critical value of the inherent noise of the
Improvement of two-way continuous-variable quantum key distribution 10
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Figure 7. (a) The secret key rate as a function of the inherent noise of PIA whose
gain is 15 for a fixed distance d = 60 km and channel noise ε = 0.02. The horizontal
reference line is drawn to represent the secret key rate of imperfect heterodyne detection
without using a PIA. The region above the reference line is the enhanced region and
the rest of the region is the degenerative region for the protocol. (b) The inherent noise
of PIA against the gain of the PIA and the transmission distance. The tolerable PIA
noise is the surface of the figure and it is constant when transmission distance is less
than the maximal distance of the protocol without a PIA and decreases to 1 when the
distance reaches the maximal distance of the protocol with a PIA. The whole region
between the plain whose inherent noise of PIA is 1 and the tolerable PIA noise are the
enhanced region.
PIA is 2.678 which we define as tolerable PIA noise. With the method to calculate
the tolerable PIA noise under a fixed gain coefficient and transmission distance, we can
draw a picture of the tolerable PIA noise over the gain of the PIA and the transmission
distance (see Fig. 7 (b)). The performance of the two-way CV-QKD protocol with
imperfect heterodyne detection can be improved by placing a PIA at the output of
the quantum channel, whose noise should be less than the tolerable PIA noise. From
Fig. 7 (b), the tolerable PIA noise is constant with transmission distance less than the
maximal distance the protocol without a PIA can achieve (e.g. 63.13 km for g=15).
This is because the tolerable PIA noise only depends on the detector’s electronic noise
υel in this model [17, 18]. After the maximal distance the protocol without a PIA can
achieve, the tolerable PIA noise decreases and finally reaches 1 (the minimal noise of
PIA), which represents the maximal distance the protocol with a PIA can achieve (e.g.
71.55 km for g=15). To improve the performance of the protocol by inserting a PIA,
the inherent noise of the PIA needs to be below the tolerable amplifier noise for a fixed
gain coefficient and transmission distance.
4. Conclusion
The imperfections of a detector can affect the performance of two-way continuous-
variable quantum key distribution protocols, and are hard to adjust experimentally.
In this paper, we propose a method to improve the performance of two-way continuous-
variable QKD protocols by adding an adjustable optical amplifier at the output of
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the quantum channel, which combined with the fixed imperfect detector, can be seen
as an adjustable receiver. Here we present two kinds of optical amplifier models, a
phase-sensitive amplifier and a phase-insensitive amplifier, to improve the performances
of homodyne detection and heterodyne detection two-way continuous-variable QKD
protocols, respectively. The simulation results against a two-mode collective entangling
cloner attack show that for homodyne detection, the optimal performance of adding a
phase-sensitive amplifier at receiver can approach the case of using a perfect detector.
On the other hand, for heterodyne detection, the optimal performance of adding a
phase-insensitive amplifier at the receiver can also approach the case of using a perfect
detector. We note that the proposed methods can improve the performance of protocols
as long as the inherent noise of the amplifier is lower than the critical value which we
define as the tolerable amplifier noise.
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Appendix A. Detailed calculation of parameter TE, covariance matrices and
symplectic eigenvalues
Here we give the detailed calculation of parameter TE, the covariance matrices γA1A3B1B3 ,
γ
xBx
A1A3B1pB6FG
and γ
xBx ,pBp
A1A3IJFGB6B7
and their symplectic eigenvalues λ1−4, λ5−10 and λ5−12.
The covariance matrix γA1A3B1B3 only depends on the system including Alice and
the quantum channel whose relationships are as follows
Eˆ3 =
√
TEEˆ2 +
√
1− TEEˆ0
Eˆ5 = −
√
1− TEEˆ2 +
√
TEEˆ0
Aˆin =
√
T1Bˆ2 +
√
1− T1Eˆ3
Eˆ4 = −
√
1− T1Bˆ2 +
√
T1Eˆ3
Aˆout =
√
TAAˆin +
√
1− TAAˆ2
Aˆ3 = −
√
1− TAAˆin +
√
TAAˆ2
Bˆ3 =
√
T2Aˆout +
√
1− T2Eˆ5
Eˆ6 = −
√
1− T2Aˆout +
√
T2Eˆ5
, (A.1)
where B2, B3 and E0 represents the original mode from Bob, the mode back to Bob
and the vacuum state. T1 and T2 are the channel transmission efficiency, which we use
T = T1 = T2 for calculation here. TA and TE are the transmittances in Alice and Eve.
After simplification, the state B3 is
Improvement of two-way continuous-variable quantum key distribution 12
Bˆ3 =
√
TATBˆ2 +
√
(1− TA)TAˆ2 (A.2)
+
(√
TATE (1− T1)T2 −
√
(1− T2) (1− TE)
)
Eˆ2
+
(√
TA (1− TE) (1− T1)T2 −
√
TE (1− T2)
)
Eˆ0.
Therefore we can adjust parameter TE to reduce the interference of the mode B3.
When TE = 1/(1 + TTA), B3 becomes
Bˆ3 =
√
TATBˆ2 +
√
(1− TA)TAˆ2 +
√
(1− T ) (1 + TTA)Eˆ0. (A.3)
The covariance matrix γA1A3B1B3 becomes

VA · I2
√
TA(V 2A − 1) · σz 0 · I2 γA1B3 · σz√
TA(V 2A − 1) · σz γA3 · I2 γA3B1 · σz γA3B3 · I2
0 · I2 γA3B1 · σz VB · I2 γB1B3 · σz
γA1B3 · σz γA3B3 · I2 γB1B3 · σz γB3 · I2
 , (A.4)
where In is the n × n identity matrix and σz = diag (1, -1), VB, VA and VE are the
variance of EPR1, EPR2 and EPR3. Here we choose VE = 1 + 2Tε/(1− T ) for keeping
the average excess noise of forward and backward path as ε. We use the average excess
noise ε = (ε1 + ε2)/2 as the average value of forward path excess noise ε1 and backward
path excess noise ε2. γA3B3 , γA3 , γA3B1 , γA3B3 , γB3 and γB1B3 are
γA1B3 =
√
T (1− TA)(V 2A − 1)
γA3 = TAVA + T (1− TA)VB + T (1−TA)TA(1+TTA)2 VE +
T (1−T )TA(1−TA)
1+TTA
γA3B1 = −
√
T (1− TA)(V 2B − 1)
γA3B3 =
√
TTA(1− TA) (VA − TVB − 1 + T )
γB3 = TAT
2VB + (1− TA)TVA + (1− T ) (1 + TTA)
γB1B3 = T
√
TA(V 2B − 1)
. (A.5)
Similarly, the covariance matrix γ
xBx
A1A3GFB6B1p
can be written as
γ
xBx
A1A3GFB6B1p
= γA1A3GFB6B1p (A.6)
− σTA1A3GFB6B1pBx · (XγBxX)−1 · σA1A3GFB6B1pBx .
where X = diag(1, 0) and the inverse is a pseudo inverse. The matrices γA1A3GFB6B1p ,
γBx and σA1A3GFB6B1pBx can all be derived from the decomposition of the matrix
γA1A3GFB6B1pBx =
[
γA1A3GFB6B1p σ
T
A1A3GFB6B1pBx
σA1A3GFB6B1pBx γBx
]
. (A.7)
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The above matrix can be derived with appropriate rearrangement of lines and
columns from the matrix describing the system (see Fig. 3 (a))
γA1A3B1pB6BxFG = Γ
X
B1xB5
· Y BSB3F0 · Y PSAB3 · (γA1A3B1pB1xB3 ⊕ γF0G)
· (Y PSAB3 )T · (Y BSB3F0)T · (ΓXB1xB5)T , (A.8)
where γA1A3B1pB1xB3 can be got from γA1A3B3B1 through a beam splitter which
transmittance is 0.5, while γF0G is the matrix that describes the EPR of variance υ
used to model the detectors electronic noise. υ takes the appropriate value for the
homodyne or heterodyne detection case (Sec. 2).
Then the matrices Y PSAB3 = I8 ⊕ Y PSA ⊕ I4 and Y BSB3F0 describes the beam splitter
transformation that models the inefficiency of the detector and acts on modes B3 and
F0. It is given by the expression
Y BS =
[ √
η · I2
√
1− η · I2
−√1− η · I2 √η · I2
]
. (A.9)
Y BSB3F0 = I8 ⊕ Y BS ⊕ I2, (A.10)
The matrix Γx is the CNOT gate[21, 22, 23] that transfers B5 and B1x into modes
B6 and Bx. It is given by the expression
ΓXB1xB5 = I6 ⊕ Γx ⊕ I4 ,with Γx =

1 0 −k 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 k 0 1
 . (A.11)
We now have all the elements required to proceed to the calculation of the covariance
matrix γA1A3B1B3 . Then the covariance matrix γ
xBx ,pBp
A1A3IJFGB6B7
can be calculated in the
same method with two CNOT gate[21, 22, 23] Γx and Γp, which transfer B5x, B1x into
modes B6, Bx and B5p, B1p into modes B7, Bp
[
Bx
B6
]
=Γx
[
B5x
B1x
]
, with Γx=

1 0 −k 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 k 0 1
 . (A.12)
[
Bp
B7
]
=Γp
[
B5p
B1p
]
, with Γp=

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 k
−k 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 . (A.13)
Finally, we need to calculate the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrices
γA1A3B1B3 , γ
xBx
A1A3B1pB6FG
and γ
xBx ,pBp
A1A3IJFGB6B7
. Given an arbitrary N -mode covariance
matrix γ, there exists a symplectic matrix S such that
γ = Sγ⊕ST , γ⊕ =
N⊕
k=1
λk · I2, (A.14)
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where the diagonal matrix γ⊕ is called the Williamson form of γ, and the N positive
quantities λk are called the symplectic eigenvalues of γ [3]. Here the symplectic spectrum
{λk}Nk=1 can be easily computed as the standard eigenspectrum of the matrix |iΩγ|
[3], where the modulus must be understood in the operational sense. Here Ω is the
symplectic form
Ω =
N⊕
k=1
[
0 1
−1 0
]
. (A.15)
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